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The self and self-knowledge 
By Annalisa Coliva 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. x + 286. H/b £47.50. 
 
Annalisa Coliva’s collection on self-knowledge brings together papers presented 
originally at two conferences, the first held in Bigorio, Switzerland in 2004 and the 
second at the Institute of Philosophy in London in 2008. 
The collection is divided into three sections. Part One addresses the nature and 
individuation of the self, with contributions from Carol Rovane, Martine Nida-Rümelin, 
Christopher Peacocke, and John Campbell. Part Two comprises papers from Jane Heal, 
Conor McHugh and Lucy O’Brien, as well as a brief response from Peacocke to Heal and 
O’Brien, and focuses on explanation of our warrant in self-ascribing conscious mental 
states and actions. Discussion of transparency and authority are at the core of Part 
Three, with papers from Dorit Bar-On, Paul Snowdon, Akeel Bilgrami and Coliva. 
With both the middle section dedicated to discussion of Peacocke’s account of 
self-knowledge and a paper by him on first-person content and the metaphysics of the 
subject, the volume reflects the impact of Peacocke’s contribution to these topics, and 
will be of particular interest to scholars of his work. Owing to the constraints of space, I 
will focus on these papers. They are not the sum of the collection’s relevance and appeal, 
however, and there is much more of interest than it is possible for me to engage with 
here. Of particular note are the pairing of Coliva’s defence of a limited constitutivism, 
applicable only to commitments and performatives and Snowdon’s attentive 
examination of the claims that our knowledge of our phenomenal states has the features 
of authority, transparency and groundlessness in his critique of Crispin Wright’s 
constitutive account of self-knowledge (Rails to infinity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). Nida-Rümelin’s argument for the claim that the intuitive appeal 
of subject-body dualism arises from the fact that the first-person concept is the concept 
of a ‘perfect individual’—something not constituted by its properties or its material 
constitution—is also intriguing, as is Campbell’s claim that, because self-knowledge 
depends on our having knowledge of the causal connections between our mental states, 
it will thereby depend on our having knowledge of the way perception influences our 
beliefs. 
In ‘Subjects and Consciousness’ Peacocke gives a constitutive account of non-
conceptual self-representation as well as detailing the metaphysical view of the self that 
is determined by that account. For a subject to have a non-conceptual self-
representation the following necessary conditions must be met: the subject must have 
subject-reflexive mental states, and she must have a mental file on herself in which 
relevant predicative contents are integrated. A non-conceptual content will be of the 
first-person type if it refers de jure to the subject of the mental state or event of which it 
is the content. First-person contents refer to the subjects of the states in which they 
appear. 
Self-representation, thus understood, underlies Peacocke’s account of the first-
person concept, developed in more detail in other work (The mirror of the world, Oxford: 
OUP, 2013). It is by having perceptual experiences and action-awareness with 
nonconceptual first-person content that a subject is able to know that she has the 
property of being a self-referrer, for example, and it is in this way that we can explain 
the self-consciousness of first-person concept-use. 
One question that arises when reading Peacocke’s account of self-representation 
is whether we need to posit nonconceptual first-person contents in order to account for 
the capacities of adult humans to think and act. Peacocke allows not only that there may 
be a degree 0 level of self-representation, but that creatures who thus lack the capacity 
for self-representation entirely can build up a cognitive map of their environment, can 
be credited with intentions, can act, and so on, all by the use of a ‘here’ content. This 
seems to put pressure on the idea that we have a first-person content that features in 
nonconceptual mental states. Furthermore, we might wonder whether positing a 
nonconceptual content which has all the characteristics of the first-person concept that 
resist easy explanation really provides an explanation of how the first-person concept 
has those characteristics. The account seems to have pushed the problems we have in 
explaining first-person thought down a level, and in doing so we are forced to posit a 
content that refers, somewhat mysteriously, to the subject as subject. 
In giving an account of knowledge of our psychological states, our goal is that of 
explaining why our self-ascriptions of our psychological states and episodes are 
warranted, without, in doing so, jeopardizing the reliability and robustness of self-
knowledge. Peacocke’s solution to the problem focuses on consciousness as reason 
giving: the conscious occurrence of an episode of judging that p, for example, will give 
the subject a reason to self-ascribe the belief that p (Being known, Oxford: OUP, 1999). 
When the self-ascription of the belief is made for that reason, the self-ascription will be 
warranted. In ‘Reasons and Self-Knowledge’ McHugh develops the proposal, analysing 
both what kind of access and what it is that must be accessed by a subject in order for 
her to count as being justified in self-ascribing a psychological state. His aim is to avoid a 
worry raised by Coliva to the effect that for a subject to have a reason to self-ascribe a 
psychological state, she must already have knowledge of that state (‘Peacocke’s self-
knowledge’. Ratio (New series), 2008; 21: 13-27). He also defends the account from a 
further objection from Coliva. One way of developing the proposal is in terms of there 
being something it is like for the subject when she consciously judges, hopes, and so on: 
it is in virtue of their phenomenology that these conscious episodes provide the subject 
with reasons for their self-ascription. Coliva objects that certain types of conscious state 
can either fail to have a distinctive phenomenology, or—perhaps as in the case of 
wishful thinking—can have the phenomenology characteristic of a different kind of 
state, with the consequence that it will be rational for the subject to self-ascribe the state 
as a state of the wrong kind. McHugh’s response takes the form of an elaboration of the 
way in which the phenomenology of conscious states can reflect their type, and the way 
in which this phenomenology can make certain judgements rational, including, but not 
limited to, the self-ascription of those states. 
In ‘Consciousness and Self-Awareness’ Heal—focusing on what a subject is able 
to self-ascribe rather than what she is justified in self-ascribing—urges the need for 
modification of Peacocke’s proposal on the grounds that some states, while manifested 
in consciousness, cannot be self-ascribed by their subjects. She gives the example of a 
subject whose fear of authority figures is, in some sense, revealed in her conscious 
thoughts and experiences, yet who does not recognise that she fears. The subject’s fear 
is manifested in consciousness, she has the concept of fear, yet she is unable to self-
ascribe fearing. 
For this to be a counter-example to the view that a state’s being conscious 
provides the subject with a reason to self-ascribe that state we would have to think that 
the subject in question consciously fears yet doesn’t have a reason for the self-
ascription. Yet, as Peacocke points out in his response (pp. 180-181), this doesn’t seem 
to be the case. We should distinguish conscious fearing from unconscious fearing which 
results in certain other conscious thoughts and experiences. Since we need not think 
that the conscious episodes that result from an unconscious fearing make that fearing 
conscious, we do not have a case in which a subject consciously fears yet is unable to 
self-ascribe fearing. Moreover, the subject who has conscious unpleasant experiences 
that are distinct from fear when in the presence of authority figures will have reason to 
self-ascribe those unpleasant experiences, if she possesses the appropriate concepts. 
Rather than acting as a counter-example, Heal’s case in fact provides a useful illustration 
of the workings of the account. 
Self-knowledge is not limited to knowledge of our psychological attitudes: we can 
know our actions also. In ‘Knowledge of actions and tryings’ O’Brien’s target is an 
account of agents’ knowledge according to which tryings have some explanatory role to 
play. Peacocke offers a sophisticated version of this kind of account: tryings cause both 
actions and action awareness (Truly understood, Oxford: OUP, 2008). We are entitled to 
take this non-perceptual action awareness at face value, and in doing so we have 
knowledge of our actions because the cause of the action awareness, the trying, is also 
the cause of the action. O’Brien’s criticism revolves around Peacocke’s commitment to 
its being possible, for any mental action a subject performs, for that subject to believe 
that she has acted when she has not. If action awareness is produced by a trying rather 
than an action, then it should always be possible for a trying to cause action awareness 
while failing to produce the respective action. O’Brien contends that, in fact, there are a 
considerable number of mental actions for which trying to perform the action will 
amount to success (p. 171), so that it is not possible for action and knowledge of action 
to come apart. 
Coliva states her aim in compiling the collection as being that of allowing for the 
development of sophisticated arguments, thereby furthering current debates about the 
self and self-knowledge. The volume is therefore best suited to those with a good grasp 
of the topic. It is worth noting that the chapters by Rovane, Bar-On and Bilgrami offer 
statements of accounts they have presented in greater detail elsewhere (Rovane, C. The 
bounds of agency, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998; Bar-On, D. Speaking 
my mind, Oxford: OUP, 2004; Bilgrami, A. Self-knowledge and resentment, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). This notwithstanding, the collection is successful 
in achieving Coliva’s aims, and the papers within are challenging and stimulating 
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